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Complete security proofs for quantum communication protocols can be notoriously involved, which
convolutes their verification, and obfuscates the key physical insights the security finally relies on.
In such cases, for the majority of the community, the utility of such proofs may be restricted.
Here we provide a simple proof of confidentiality for parallel quantum channels established via
entanglement distillation based on hashing, in the presence of noise, and a malicious eavesdropper
who is restricted only by the laws of quantum mechanics. The direct contribution lies in improving
the linear confidentiality levels of recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols to exponential
levels for hashing protocols. The proof directly exploits the security relevant physical properties:
measurement-based quantum computation with resource states and the separation of Bell-pairs from
an eavesdropper. The proof also holds for situations where Eve has full control over the input states,
and obtains all information about the operations and noise applied by the parties. The resulting
state after hashing is private, i.e., disentangled from the eavesdropper. Moreover, the noise regimes
for entanglement distillation and confidentiality do not coincide: Confidentiality can be guaranteed
even in situation where entanglement distillation fails. We extend our results to multiparty situations
which are of special interest for secure quantum networks.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure and private quantum communication is a concept
of fundamental importance for emerging quantum tech-
nologies. The secure generation of a secret key for the en-
cryption of classical data has received enormous attention
in recent years [1–7], and is believed to be one of the key
applications of quantum information science. Security
has been shown under ever more general assumptions,
finally arriving at device-independent proofs where the
devices for secret key expansion are not trustworthy [8–
10]. However, while establishing entanglement between
two remote parties served as key ingredient in many se-
curity proofs of QKD, most existing proofs are not es-
tablished by sharpening this intuition, i.e. they follow a
more convoluted, tedious, and less straightforward route
[2, 11–13].
Here we consider the problem of confidential or secure
transmission of quantum information via quantum chan-
nels, equally important as QKD but far less studied.
This task is closely related to the confidential genera-
tion of maximally entangled, distributed quantum states.
Both are essential ingredients of quantum networks [14–
16], quantum key agreement protocols [17–19], and dis-
tributed quantum computation [20]. In an idealized,
noiseless situation a secure quantum channel, studied in
[21–23], may be established in terms of teleporation [24]
using a perfect Bell-pair. The situation turns out to be
far less straightforward in a noisy scenario. Neverthe-
less, it was shown that private entanglement is feasible
when considering noisy channels and perfect operations
[25, 26], as well as noise in local operations for indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) [27] and non i.i.d.
[28] situations. The latter works consider the recurrence-
type entanglement distillation protocols [25, 26], which
∗ These authors contributed equally
probabilistically increase the fidelity and factor out any
eavesdropper with a linear rate of convergence in terms
of initial states.
Hashing protocols [29–36] are one-way entanglement dis-
tillation protocols (EDP) which overcome these limita-
tions. They are deterministic and converge exponentially
fast in terms of initial states towards several copies of
a maximally entangled state. This enables for several
confidential quantum channels in parallel, crucial for big
quantum data transmission [37] and which is in contrast
to recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols.
In this paper we provide a proof of confidentiality for
hashing protocols in a noisy setting where the eavesdrop-
per has full control over all the initial states. Since the
confidentiality of recurrence-type entanglement distilla-
tion protocols [25, 26] has been shown in similar scenarios
[28], this alone is not too surprising, even though hash-
ing enables for exponential confidentiality levels rather
than linear ones. Nevertheless, due to the simplicity of
the confidentiality proof we clearly identify the relevant
elements of physical properties from which the formal
claim follows: the purity of the target state for noiseless
distillation protocols and the way one deals with noise
in measurement-based quantum computation (MBQC)
with resource states. We emphasize that both are not
exploitable in a noisy gate-based implementation as we
illustrate later. The interest of using such characteristics,
arguably, goes beyond the direct cryptographic state-
ment they are implying. What is more, we identify a
regime of noise where privacy, or equivalently confiden-
tiality, is feasible, whereas distillation is not. Further-
more we show that hashing establishes privacy even when
the eavesdropper is provided with information regarding
all noise processes occurring in Alice’s and Bob’s labora-
tory, which is one step towards device independence for
protocols with a quantum output.
Early security proofs for QKD [7] rely on fault-tolerant
quantum computation to reduce the problem of proving
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2security to a noiseless setting, and utilize quantum ran-
dom hashing [29] to verify the successful generation of
entanglement. In contrast, our approach eliminates the
necessity of fault-tolerant quantum computation by ex-
ploiting physical properties of MBQC, and we use hash-
ing as an active tool to establish high-fidelity entangled
pairs via entanglement distillation rather than verifying
them. Other works [1, 4, 6] also use the existence of
(one-way) entanglement distillation protocols. However,
earlier works [1, 6, 7] lack a full treatment of the finite
size setting, crucial for realistic regimes [11]. In contrast,
here we analyse the finite size performance of hashing
and explicitly provide confidentiality levels also in non-
i.i.d. scenarios.
Entanglement distillation protocols aim at distilling en-
tanglement from a noisy ensemble of bi- or multipar-
tite quantum states via local operations and measure-
ments. Hashing protocols [29–36] form a specific subset
of those protocols, which rely on the concept of likely
subspaces [38], used in information theory, and univer-
sal hash functions [39], typically applied in the context
of privacy amplification. Their operation is usually de-
scribed on a large, noisy ensemble (called initial states)
and one distills in the asymptotic limit a fraction of sys-
tems in a maximally entangled state, see Appendix A for
more details. However, it was shown that hashing via
quantum gates fails in the presence of noise [40]. This
drawback is overcome by measurement-based quantum
information processing [41]. There, the desired quan-
tum operation is realized via Bell-measurements between
the input quantum state and the input qubits of a re-
source state, referred to as read-in measurements. Con-
sequently the only source of noise within this computa-
tional approach is due to imperfect resource states and
noisy Bell-measurements (which can be accounted for by
an increased level of the noise acting on the resource state,
see [40]). A measurement-based implementation of the
hashing protocol, see Appendix A 2, is capable of distill-
ing entanglement for local depolarizing noise (LDN) up
to 7% acting on each qubit of the resource state [40]. This
is due to an observation made in [42]: LDN acting on the
input qubits of the resource state can virtually be moved
to the initial states. Furthermore, LDN noise acting on
the output qubits of the resource state can be assumed to
act afterwards, since it commutes with the read-in mea-
surements. These observations provide insights how one
deals with LDN in MBQC, a physical characteristic which
is not directly usable in quantum circuits, see Appendix
A 2. More precisely, for gate-based implementations the
situation is more complex and difficult to formalize in a
useful way, since noise introduced by quantum gates gets
highly correlated on propagating noise through the entire
circuit.
In a multipartite setting, a measurement-based imple-
mentation of the hashing protocol might turn out to be
very useful for large scale quantum network architectures
which rely on e.g. GHZ states [43].
In this paper we will use the terms confidential, secure,
privacy, private states and private entanglement. There-
fore we want to clarify their relationship and their dis-
tinction before using them.
A communication channel, either classical or quantum,
is referred to as confidential if an eavesdropper can not
obtain any information regarding the data being trans-
mitted. Nevertheless, the eavesdropper might change the
data during transmission without being detected. There-
fore we refer to privacy as the ability of two (or more) par-
ties to establish a confidential communication channel. A
communication channel is considered to be secure, if it is
confidential and authenticated, where authenticated here
means that the eavesdropper can not alter the data with-
out being detected by the parties. In the quantum case
we call a state private if it can be used to establish a con-
fidential quantum channel, i.e., a state which is entangled
between Alice and Bob but not entangled with the eaves-
dropper. The term private state was already introduced
in the context of QKD for generating classical keys from
states with bound entanglement [44] and computing se-
cret key capacities of quantum channels [45]. For that
purpose [44, 45] consider additional systems, known as
shield systems, to decouple an eavesdropper from maxi-
mally entangled states to generate a secure key between
two parties. However, privacy or private states as we
consider here, refer to the ability of establishing a con-
fidential quantum channel without the notion of shield
systems. The entanglement of such a state is then re-
ferred to as private entanglement.
For full formal definitions, proofs and supportive infor-
mation we refer to the supplemental material. However,
the confidentiality proof of hashing is self-contained in
the main text.
II. RESULTS
We consider two categories of players: protocol partici-
pants and Eve, the eavesdropper, from which the partici-
pants request their initial states ρ(n) used for distillation.
The former, connected via classical authenticated chan-
nels, wish to distill m copies of a certain state |ϕ〉. In
the bipartite setting, the state |ϕ〉 might correspond to a
perfect Bell-pair [29] whereas in the mutlipartite setting
to a specific multipartite state [30–36] . The latter dis-
tributes the initial states via noisy quantum channels and
has full control over them. In particular, Eve might be
fully entangled with all initial states, which corresponds
to the most general scenario how initial states can be dis-
tributed.
Hashing in its original form assumes initial states of ten-
sor product form, i.e. ρ(n) = ρ⊗n where ρ is a density
operator of a multi-partite quantum state and n is asymp-
totically large. Furthermore, distillation will only be fea-
sible if the entropy of the initial states is sufficiently low,
see e.g. [29] for bipartite hashing.
To accommodate these requirements, we propose the fol-
lowing protocol: First the participants agree on a number
of desired output systems m and a confidentiality level ε.
From these values they compute the number of systems
n which are necessary to meet both conditions, assum-
ing the worst case entropy for the initial states. Then,
the participants request n + kn systems from Eve sub-
ject to distillation. They apply a local twirling operation
which ensures that the systems are diagonal within the
respective basis (for the bipartite protocol they twirl to-
wards Werner form). Next, they sacrifice kn systems for
parameter estimation in order to estimate the actual fi-
3delity F relative to |ϕ〉 for each system. Depending on
their estimate F , they either abort the protocol because
the fidelity is outside [Fmin, Fmax] or they continue with a
measurement-based implementation of the hashing pro-
tocol. Finally they output m systems. When generalizing
to arbitrary initial states the protocol will be prepended
by a symmetrization step.
To formalize our confidentiality criterion we recall some
basic terminology introduced in [28]. We define the
noiseless ideal map F , which takes as input the ini-
tial states and outputs, depending on parameter estima-
tion, either the asymptotic state of the hashing proto-
col, |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|⊗m, or some output state, σ⊥PE . For example,
in a bipartite setting |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|⊗m = |B00〉 〈B00|⊗m where
|B00〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉)/
√
2. The ideal map F abstracts the
distillation protocol for an initial state ρ as a process: in-
ternally it runs the real protocol for initial state ρ to its
very end which succeeds with probability pρ, and depend-
ing on parameter estimation, it either replaces the final
state with its asymptotic state, or it outputs whatever
state was reached by the protocol, σ⊥PE . This approach
to define ideal functionality stems from well-established
ideas in QKD [46]. Formally we define
(F ⊗ idE) (|ψ〉 〈ψ|PE) = pρ |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|⊗m ⊗ σE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|f
+ (1− pρ)σ⊥PE ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail|f (1)
where |ψ〉PE is a purification of the initial state ρ pro-
vided by Eve and pρ denotes the probability of the pro-
tocol succeeding for initial state ρ. The system f distin-
guishes the accepting from the aborting branch.
To analyze confidentiality taking into account realistic
noisy scenarios, we also define the noisy ideal map Fα,
where α characterizes the level of noise, as Fα = Nα ◦F ,
where Nα denotes the noise process acting on the output
qubits of the resource states of hashing.
We first clarify the noise processes we assume to act on
the resource states of the measurement-based implemen-
tation of hashing, which motivate our definition of the
ideal noisy map. We observe that there are a number of
dominating sources of noise: noise on the resource states,
noise on the read-in Bell measurements, and noise on the
initial states subject to distillation.
For the noise acting on the resource states we assume i.i.d.
local depolarizing noise. This is physically reasonable due
to the observations in [47], which shows that i.i.d. local
depolarizing noise provides an accurate approximation of
noise acting on resource states if these states get gener-
ated locally via entanglement distillation.
The resource states for the measurement-based imple-
mentation of hashing consist only of input and output
qubits, see Appendix A 2 for further details. We de-
note the noise acting on the input qubits and output
qubits of the resource states by Nin =
∏n
j=1Dj(α) and
Nout =
∏m
k=1Dk(α) respectively where
Dj(α)ρ = αρ+ 1− α
4
(ρ+XjρXj + YjρYj + ZjρZj),
(2)
with α ∈ [0, 1] quantifies the level of noise and the sub-
script j denotes the qubit on which the Pauli operators
act on. Furthermore, we can take into account for the
noise which the read-in Bell measurements introduce by
a lower value of α in Nin, which we denote by β, see [40].
Hence, we have Nin =
∏n
j=1Dj(β).
Because we can now mathematically shift the noise from
the input qubits of the resource states to the initial
states, we decompose the ideal noisy map Fα as the
concatenation of noise acting on the initial states fol-
lowed by the noiseless ideal hashing protocol and noise
acting on the output qubits of the hashing protocol, i.e.
Fα = Nout ◦ F ◦ Nin. Because we can take into account
for Nin in the parameter estimation step of the ideal map
F we end up with Fα = Nα ◦ F , where we have defined
Nα = Nout.
This enables us now to precisely define the term confi-
dentiality. In particular, we call the hashing protocol Eα
ε-confidential, if
‖Eα −Fα‖ ≤ ε (3)
where ‖∆‖ = supk∈N ‖∆⊗ idk‖op,1 for a CPTP map ∆
with ‖∆‖op,1 := sup‖ρ‖1≤1 ‖∆(ρ)‖1 and ‖ρ‖1 = tr
√
ρρ†
denotes the 1−norm of a density operator ρ, see also [48].
Observe that the state |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|⊗m in the accepting branch
of Fα, see (1), is private, i.e., a state which is disentangled
from Eve. This motivates the term privacy distillation.
We outline the remainder of this paper as follows: We
start by estimating the rate of convergence of noiseless
bipartite hashing for finitely many i.i.d. initial states.
Next, we generalize this result to arbitrary initial states
including the eavesdropper’s system via the post-selection
technique. This will finally imply the confidentiality
guarantees for the noisy measurement-based implemen-
tation of hashing.
The hashing protocol [29] deterministically converges ex-
ponentially fast towards several copies of |B00〉 for i.i.d.
initial states. In particular, we find for the modified (i.e.,
our proposed) hashing protocol E , taking n + kn initial
states ρ, that
‖E(ρ⊗n+kn)−F(ρ⊗n+kn)‖1
≤ 2 [2 exp(−nx1(δ)) + 2−nδ
+2 exp
(−(Fmax − Fmin)2kn/16)] (4)
where x1(δ) = 1/amax
[
(gmax + δ) log
(
1 + δgmax
)
− δ
]
and amax, gmax are constants depending on Fmin and
Fmax. The parameter δ stems from the hashing pro-
tocol [29] and affects the number of output systems
m = n(1 − S(ρ) − 2δ) where S(ρ) denotes the von Neu-
mann entropy of ρ as well as the rate of convergence gov-
erned by (4). For our purposes we choose δ = n−1/5,
see Appendix C. In addition, the right-hand side of (4)
approaches zero exponentially fast.
Eq. (4) can be derived from the following observa-
tions, see also Appendix C: The 1−norm induced dis-
tance of E(ρ⊗n+kn) and F(ρ⊗n+kn) is equal to the dis-
tance within the ok−branch, because E and F agree
on the fail−branch. The protocol can fail due to
three reasons where each type of failure occurs with a
certain probability. The first one corresponds to the
case that the ensemble of Bell pairs falls outside of
the likely subspace and is given by 2 exp(−nx1(n−1/5)).
The second one bounds the probability of misidenti-
fying the string by exp(−n4/5 ln 2), and the third one
4bounds the failure probability of parameter estimation
by 2 exp
(−(Fmax − Fmin)2kn/16).
Nevertheless, (4) is insufficient to prove full cryptographic
confidentiality, as it only concerns the systems of the par-
ticipants and i.i.d. initial states. So the next step is to
generalize (4) to arbitrary initial states including the sys-
tem of Eve which is the topic of the next section.
In order to provide an estimate of (3) for bi- and multi-
partite hashing protocols in terms of i.i.d. initial states,
e.g. (4), we proceed similar to the approach of [28]: First
we relate the distance of the real and ideal map including
Eve’s purifying system at the beginning of the protocol
to the distance between the respective maps concerning
the systems of the participants only. Second we use the
post-selection technique [46], which implies that the dis-
tance between the real and ideal map for any purification
of the initial states is bounded by a specific pure state,
a purification of the so called de-Finetti Hilbert-Schmidt
state.
We eliminate the first issue by using an inherent charac-
teristic of noiseless distillation protocols: the target state
of such protocols shared between Alice and Bob is pure,
provided the parameter estimation is passed. Therefore
the state of Alice and Bob is independent of Eve, i.e.
there is no residual entanglement to her. We formal-
ize this intuition via the following observation, rigorously
proven in Appendix D: If the output of the real and ideal
map, i.e. E and F respectively, differ at most ε for a
particular initial state ρ, then they differ at most 4
√
ε on
any purification |ψ〉 of ρ, i.e.
‖(E ⊗ idE −F ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE)‖1 ≤ 4
√
ε. (5)
The next step is to relate non-i.i.d. initial states to i.i.d.
initial states. Recall that the post-selection technique is
applicable to permutation invariant maps only. Because
hashing protocols are not permutation invariant maps, we
have to prepend the overall protocol by a symmetrization
step in order to apply the post-selection technique. This
finally enables us to prove confidentiality of hashing pro-
tocols according to (3) via the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Post-selection-based reduction technique).
Let Es be the real protocol and Fs the ideal protocol
prepended by a symmetrization step (s) taking n + kn
initial states. Let E and F be the sub-protocols after sym-
metrization. Then we have
‖Es −Fs‖ ≤ 4gn+kn,d
√
max
σAB
∥∥(E − F) (σ⊗n+knAB )∥∥1
(6)
where d denotes the dimension of an individual system
and gn+kn,d =
(
n+kn+d2−1
n
) ≤ (n+ kn+ 1)d2−1.
The parameter d in Theorem 1 corresponds to the di-
mension of each individual initial state, therefore it is
constant for a specific protocol and we have for M par-
ticipants that d = 2M .
We sketch the proof of Theorem 1 as follows: The post-
selection technique of [46] implies that ‖Es − Fs‖ =
sup|ψ〉ABE ‖(Es−Fs)⊗ idE(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)‖1 is bound by evalu-
ating this expression for a particular state, a purification
of the de-Finetti Hilbert-Schmidt state. Hence we apply
our previous observation, i.e. (5), to that particular ini-
tial state which reduces the confidentiality proof to i.i.d.
initial states. For the complete proof of Theorem 1 we
refer to Appendix E.
We now easily conclude confidentiality of the noiseless
bipartite hashing protocol prepended by symmetrization
by combining Theorem 1 for d = 4 and (4) which leads
to
‖Es −Fs‖ ≤ 4
√
2(n+ kn+ 1)15
×
[
2 exp(−nx1(n−1/5)) + exp
(
−n4/5 ln 2
)
+2 exp
(−(Fmax − Fmin)2kn/16)]1/2 . (7)
Eq. (7) analytically proves that arbitrary confidential-
ity levels can be achieved via the hashing protocol [29]
and finally enables us to show confidentiality for a noisy
measurement-based implementation of the hashing pro-
tocol.
Recall that the resource states, necessary for a
measurement-based implementation of the hashing pro-
tocol, are subject to LDN acting on all qubits, D(α) =∏n
l=1Dl(α) where Dl(α) is defined in Eq. (2) and that
we include the noise of a noisy Bell-measurement at the
read-in in the value of α in (2), see [40]. For a more de-
tailed discussion of this noise model we refer to [47] and
Appendix A 2.
The confidentiality proof for the noisy measurement-
based implementation of hashing now concludes by us-
ing the following intuition from MBQC with resource
states: the LDN on the input qubits can be moved, due to
the symmetry of Bell-states, to the initial states whereas
LDN acting on the output qubits can be assumed to act
after the protocol. Therefore one is left with a noiseless
hashing protocol generating pure states affected by LDN.
We reiterate that such an approach is not directly appli-
cable in the setting of gate-based implementations.
We sharpen this observation as follows: The resource
state of the protocol consists only of input and output
qubits, see Appendix A 2 and , and according to [42] we
can virtually move the noise acting on the input qubits
to the initial states provided by Eve. Thus we deal with
this part of the noise via a modification of parameter es-
timation, since the entropy of the initial states increases
after virtually moving the noise. The noise acting on the
output qubits of the resource states can be assumed to
act after the protocol completes, as that noise commutes
with the read-in Bell-measurements. This leaves us with
a noiseless protocol followed by LDN acting on the output
qubits, which just slightly depolarizes the pure Bell-pairs
from noiseless hashing. Moreover, this noise stems from
the apparatus so this does not jeopardize confidentiality.
In particular, because LDN is a CPTP map, the contrac-
tivity of the 1−norm implies (see also Appendix F) that
‖Es,α −Fs,α‖ ≤ ‖Es −Fs‖ (8)
where Es,α and Fs,α denote the real and the ideal noisy
hashing protocol prepended by symmetrization, and noise
of strength 1 − α of the form (2) acts on each qubit of
the resource state independently and identically. Hence
the noisy implementation offers the same confidentiality
guarantees as the noiseless implementation, the protocol
just simply aborts more often during parameter estima-
tion.
5We highlight that the proof of confidentiality for noisy
hashing does not require any numeric evidence, whereas
the proof in [28] for the distillation protocol [25] relies on
numerical simulations. Furthermore the tolerable noise
for post-selection is significantly higher, namely of the
order of several percent per qubit compared to O(10−20)
in [28], although it should be mentioned that the noise
models are different and cannot directly be compared.
Furthermore we find that there exists a regime of noise
for bipartite hashing where privacy, or equivalently con-
fidentiality, is achievable even though distillation is not
feasible. For this regime, the privacy regime, hashing
decreases the fidelity of each output system relative to
|B00〉, i.e., the protocol washes out entanglement rather
than distilling it, but nevertheless, any eavesdropper fac-
tors out. In contrast, if the noise level is within the distil-
lation regime the fidelity of each output system relative to
|B00〉 increases, and, as a consequence, any eavesdropper
factors out. For private states in the context of QKD a
similar observation was made in [44], where it was shown
that even though entanglement distillation is not feasible
yet secure keys can still be generated from private states
with bound entanglement.
It is interesting to qualitatively compare these findings
to earlier work: in [27, 49] confidentiality aspects were
studied in the framework of a gate-based implementation
of the entanglement distillation protocol of [25]. It was
also found that the noise regimes for privacy and distilla-
tion do not coincide, but contrary to the results presented
here, the privacy regime for the gate based implementa-
tion was found to be a subset of the distillation regime.
For more details on those noise regimes we refer to Ap-
pendix B.
We consider the scenario where the local apparatus leaks
all the information about the noise processes realized (by
the noisy resource states of the hashing protocol) to Eve
as in [27, 28]. Theorem 7 of [28] states that if a real proto-
col Eα is ε-confidential, then it is 2√ε-confidential if the
noise transcripts leak to Eve. The resulting states remain
private and enable for confidential quantum channels.
The hashing protocol [29] can be generalized to mul-
tipartite quantum states [30–36], which is relevant for
distributed quantum computation [20], quantum key
agreement protocols [17–19] and quantum networks [14–
16, 43]. Also for those protocols one shows their confi-
dentiality by following the same line of argumentation,
which can be found in Appendix G.
III. DISCUSSION
In summary we have analytically shown that noisy
measurement-based implementations of bi- and multi-
partite hashing protocols establish exponential confi-
dentiality levels. We directly exploited the properties
of MBQC with resource states which leads, together
with the purity of the asymptotic state of noiseless
hashing and the post-selection technique, to a short,
straightforward and transparent confidentiality proof.
Furthermore, the privacy and distillation regimes do
not coincide, similarly to private states with bound
entanglement in the context of QKD. In particular,
there exists a regime of local i.i.d. noise where privacy
is achievable, but distillation is not. In this regime, any
eavesdropper is factored out despite no entanglement
being distilled. Nevertheless, in both regimes the final
states are disentangled from any eavesdropper, which
enables for secure quantum channels, if the information
regarding the noise processes do not leak to the eaves-
dropper. If this information leaks to the eavesdropper,
confidential quantum channels are still feasible as the
resulting states remain private.
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Appendix A: Bipartite hashing protocol and its
measurement-based implementation
In this section of the supplementary material we provide
a short review of the biparite hashing protocol [29], we in-
troduce the measurement-based implementation thereof
[40] and discuss its advantages over a gate-based ap-
proach.
In the following we denote the four Bell-basis states by
|Bij〉 = (id⊗σjxσiz) |B00〉 where i ∈ {0, 1} is referred to as
the phase bit, j ∈ {0, 1} is referred to as the amplitude
bit of |Bij〉 and |B00〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉)/
√
2.
1. Entanglement distillation via hashing
Entanglement distillation protocols distill a maximally
entangled state from several noisy copies provided the ini-
tial fidelity, defined as F (ρ, σ) = tr
√
ρ1/2σρ1/2 for den-
sity operators ρ and σ where σ = |ϕ〉 〈ϕ| (the desired
target state), is sufficiently high. Several protocols have
been proposed for this task, which we divide into two
categories depending on the number of systems they uti-
lize within each basic distillation step. In the first group
we have recurrence-type protocols [25, 26] which work
pair-wise, whereas in the second group we have so-called
hashing-type protocols [29] that operate, in principle, on
the entire ensemble. Common to both classes of proto-
cols is that they utilize local operations, measurements
and classical communication.
Recurrence-type protocols are robust against local noise
in both the gate-based [50] and measurement-based im-
plementations [42]. In contrast, the gate-based imple-
mentations of hashing-type protocols are fragile with re-
spect to noise of the local apparatus as we will discuss
briefly.
The hashing protocol [29] is an entanglement distillation
protocol which operates on a large ensemble of noisy ini-
tial states in an iterative manner. In its standard ver-
sion, the participants assume to receive n copies of an
6initial state ρ, where ρ is a two qubit density operator
diagonal in the Bell-basis. The hashing protocol out-
puts m = n(1 − S(ρ)) systems in the asymptotic limit
where S(ρ) < 1 denotes the von-Neumann entropy of ρ.
At each basic distillation step, which we also refer to as
a round, the participants apply local operations accord-
ing to a string drawn uniformly at random and followed
by a controlled NOT into one target state. More pre-
cisely, they accumulate the phase and/or amplitude bit
i and j of ρ =
∑
i,j pij |Bij〉 〈Bij | of each individual pair
into one target system via several controlled NOTs. Re-
call that such a bilateral controlled NOT transforms a
tensor product of two Bell-states |Bi1j1〉 and |Bi2j2〉 to
the tensor-product state |Bi1⊕i2j1〉 |Bi1j1⊕j2〉. Next, the
parties measure the target Bell-pair which is determined
by the string. This measurement reveals essentially one
bit of parity information about the remaining ensemble,
thereby purifying it (as the mixedness of a state can be
interpreted as a lack of classical information). The basic
distillation step is iterated several times and in the end a
fraction of purified systems remains.
Hashing protocols rely on two fundamental concepts re-
lated to classical coding theory: likely subspace encoding
and universal hashing. The idea of likely subspace encod-
ing for ensembles of quantum states was first mentioned,
to our knowledge, in [38]. There it was proven that an
asymptotic ensemble of i.i.d. quantum states ρ⊗n where
ρ =
∑
i pi |vi〉 〈vi| is a density operator which receives
almost all its weight from a small subspace spanned by
so-called likely sequences {⊗k |vi(j)k 〉〈vi(j)k |}j∈J where one
identifies a specific sequence
⊗
k |vik〉 〈vik | with the bit
string (i1, ..., in). More precisely, the probability of find-
ing a particular sequence (j1, ..., jn) that is outside this
likely subspace can be made arbitrarily small in terms
of the number of copies n of ρ. In case of the hashing
protocol the vectors |vi〉 in ρ =
∑
i pi |vi〉 〈vi| of the ini-
tial states ρ⊗n correspond to individual Bell-states |Bij〉.
The original proposal of the likely subspace in [38] relies
on the weak law of large numbers, which is an asymp-
totic statement. Universal hashing [39] is a widely stud-
ied concept which turned out especially useful in privacy
amplification [51], a critical part in quantum key distri-
bution protocols. Privacy amplification minimizes the
amount of information an eavesdropper has with respect
to a generated key. For that purpose the participants use
so-called universal2 function families. A family of func-
tions G = {gi : A→ B}i∈I is said to be universal2 if for
any x 6= y ∈ A the probability that gi(x) = gi(y) is at
most 1/|B| when gi is chosen uniformly at random from
G.
One basic distillation step of the hashing protocol com-
prises the following steps: one participant draws a string
s ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n (which we also refer to as parity hash
string) uniformly at random, corresponding to a univer-
sal hash function. Next, the participant classically com-
municates s to the other participant and both perform,
according to s, local operations and bilateral controlled
NOTs on their parts of the quantum states. Depending
on st ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} they bypass (st = 0) or they accumu-
late either the amplitude bit j (st = 1), the phase bit i
(st = 2) or both, amplitude and phase bit i⊕ j, (st = 3)
for the Bell-pair |Bij〉 indexed by 1 ≤ t ≤ n into the first
pair for which st 6= 0 via a bilateral controlled NOT. Fi-
nally, they measure both parts of this target system using
the Z observable which reveals almost one bit of parity
information about the remaining ensemble. This basic
distillation step is iterated n−m times, thereby collecting
sufficient amount of information regarding parities about
the remaining quantum systems. The parity information
is finally used to restore the systems to the |B00〉⊗m state.
For further detsails on the hashing protocol, we refer the
reader to [29].
If one considers instead of asymptotic ensembles an ini-
tial ensemble of finite size n, bipartite hashing can still
be used to distill entanglement. For finitely many ini-
tial states slightly fewer systems with a finite infidelity
(i.e. there is a non-zero deviation relative to the state
|B00〉⊗m) will be distilled. More precisely, for finite size
hashing the number of output systems is m = n(1 −
S(ρ) − 2δ) where the tunable parameter δ characterizes
the width of the likely subspace. The parameter δ turns
out to be crucial when determining the rate of conver-
gence towards |B00〉⊗m and we will choose for our pur-
poses δ = n−1/5.
There also exist extensions of the bipartite hashing pro-
tocol to a multipartite setting allowing the distillation
of two colorable graph states [30], all graph states [31],
GHZ states [32, 33], CSS states [34] and stabilizer states
[35, 36]. Conceptually those types of protocols rely on
the same ideas as bipartite hashing. Again, local parity
collecting operations are used to reveal information about
the remaining ensemble. They are especially well-suited
to distill resource states for measurement-based imple-
mentations of particular quantum tasks such as quantum
error correction.
In the main text we have shown the confidentiality of
the hashing protocol for two colorable graph states [30]
and we provide a detailed description thereof within this
supplementary material.
2. Measurement-based implementation
One alternative to the gate-based implementation of a
quantum circuit is measurement-based quantum compu-
tation [52, 53]. A quantum operation O can be imple-
mented by coupling the input qubits via Bell measure-
ments to a universal resource state, e.g. a 2D cluster state
[54]. For circuits which contain only gates from the Clif-
ford group and Pauli measurements one can also use an
optimized, special purpose resource state of minimal size
[41]. This resource state will consist of only n+m qubits
for a circuit which maps n qubits to m qubits. Hashing
protocols, like most other entanglement distillation pro-
tocols, belong to this class of circuits and thus allow for
such a minimal size measurement-based implementation.
The results of the Bell measurements at the read-in de-
termine both the results of the parity measurements of
the hashing protocol as well as the Pauli byproduct op-
erators on the final output states. For more informations
and examples see [28, 55].
The noiseless implementation of the hashing protocol pro-
duces asymptotically perfect Bell-pairs. Therefore any
eavesdropper is factored out, in the limit, guaranteeing
perfect confidentiality. But even if i.i.d. local depolariz-
ing noise acts on the quantum gates, any gate-based ap-
7proach fails [40]. This is due to the O(n) bilateral CNOTs
within every distillation round, which washes out all in-
formation from the initial states. Hence the gate-based
implementation of hashing is limited to the noiseless sce-
nario only.
This drawback is overcome by a measurement-based ap-
proach [40]. A measurement-based implementation of the
hashing protocol is rather straightforward: a sequence
of parity hash strings is drawn uniformly at random by
one participant and classically communicated to all other
participants. They construct the corresponding resource
state according to that particular sequence. This re-
source state is finally coupled to the initial states via
Bell-measurements which implements the hashing proto-
col in a measurement-based fashion.
Since all gates of the hashing protocol are elements of
the Clifford group the resource states consist only of in-
put and output qubits, see discussion above. This implies
that the resource states are of minimal size and therefore
optimal with respect to the number of qubits which need
to be stored temporarily.
In [40] it was shown that a measurement-based implemen-
tation of the hashing protocol [29] is capable of distilling
entanglement for imperfect resource states and imperfect
in-coupling Bell-measurements. There the resource states
are affected by i.i.d. local depolarizing noise (LDN) of the
form D(α) = ∏nl=1Dl(α) acting on all qubits of the re-
source states where
Dj(α)ρ = αρ+ 1− α
4
(ρ+XjρXj + YjρYj + ZjρZj)
(A1)
and α characterizes the strength of the noise. In partic-
ular, the measurement-based implementation of hashing
tolerates up to 7% of noise acting on each qubit of the re-
source state [40]. In [56], it was shown that any local noise
process can be brought into a local depolarizing form.
This observation also motivated the noise model of local
depolarizing noise chosen in [42] to study measurement-
based recurrence-type distillation protocols. There it was
shown that the measurement-based implementation of
recurrence-type distillation protocols is capable of tol-
erating up to 24% of noise acting on each qubit of the
resource state. Furthermore, as studied in [47], local
i.i.d. depolarizing noise provides an accurate and reason-
able approximation if one generates the resource states
via entanglement distillation. The generation of resource
states via entanglement distillation also provides an effi-
cient scheme to create high-fidelity resource states, cru-
cial for accurate measurement-based quantum computa-
tion via resource states.
The reason why a measurement-based implementation of
the hashing protocol in the presence of i.i.d. LDN of
the form D(α) works is due to a fundamental observation
made in [42]: If the resource states undergo a local de-
polarizing noise of the form D(α) = ∏nl=1Dl(α) then one
can virtually exchange the location of the LDN when fol-
lowed by a Bell-measurement, i.e. PD1(α)ρ = PD2(α)ρ
where Pρ = PBρP †B and PB denotes a projector on a
Bell-state. Intuitively speaking, as PB = |Bij〉 〈Bij |, this
is due the symmetry (id ⊗ σ) |Bij〉 = (σ ⊗ id) |Bij〉 up
to a global phase where σ is a Pauli operator. This
enables us to effectively move the noise acting on the
input qubits of the resource states to the input state
(as we couple the input state to the resource state via
Bell-measurements). We emphasize that this holds for
LDN of the form D(α) = ∏nl=1Dl(α) and, more impor-
tantly, this can not be done within the circuit model even
though the gate-based and measurement-based approach
to quantum computation are computationally equivalent.
In particular, computational equivalence does not neces-
sarily imply equivalent robustness with respect to noise.
This observation becomes more clear when one considers
the noise processes as being part of the protocol. In the
measurement-based scenario with resource states, the ob-
servation of [42] implies that the i.i.d. LDN acting on the
input qubits of the resource state can effectively be moved
to the initial states, see discussion above. The i.i.d. LDN
acting on the output qubits can be applied afterwards,
because the quantum computation at hand is performed
in terms of Bell-measurements at the read-in. This leaves
one with a perfect quantum operation on a modifed input
state, where i.i.d. LDN is applied, followed by the noise
process of the output qubits. In [57] this observation was
applied to measurement-based quantum communication,
where it was shown that very high error thresholds (of the
order of 10 % per qubit) can be obtained. In contrast, in
the gate-based approach noise accumulates through re-
peatedly applying quantum gates. Furthermore, on com-
muting noise through the gates of a quantum circuit to-
wards the input, the noise processes might get correlated
due to commutation relations, maybe ending up in cor-
related noise rather than i.i.d. LDN acting on the input
state. So to summarize, this observation shows that at
least for i.i.d. LDN the measurement- and gate-based ap-
proach are not equivalent.
To summarize, the measurement-based approach permits
a noisy implementation of the hashing protocol whereas a
standard gate-based implementation fails in the presence
of noise.
Appendix B: Noise regimes
In the main text we identified two different regimes of
i.i.d. LDN of the form D(α) = ∏nl=1Dl(α), where Dl(α)
is defined via (A1), acting on the resource states of the
measurement-based implementation of hashing: privacy
and purification regime. Within the first regime any
eavesdropper factors out but no entanglement will be dis-
tilled. In particular, for bipartite hashing, the fidelity
relative to |B00〉 will decrease due to the protocol. In
contrast, in the purification regime any eavesdropper is
factored out and entanglement is distilled, i.e. the fidelity
relative to the target state increases.
To see this we recall the conditions on the noise param-
eters for purification and privacy. The noiseless hash-
ing protocol distills perfect Bell pairs in the asymptotic
limit of infinitely many initial states in Werner form as
soon as their fidelity exceeds Fcrit = 0.8107, see [29]. In
this case the final Bell pairs are private (and thus con-
fidentiality is guaranteed) and Fcrit can be translated to
qcrit = (4Fcrit − 1)/3 ≈ 0.7476. In the noisy case one has
two conditions for the noise parameters α and q, which
quantify the level of noise on the resource states and the
fidelity of the initial states, respectively (see also [42]) for
8asymptotic ensemble sizes:
α2q > qcrit (B1)
and
α2 > q. (B2)
Here, (B1) guarantees that the fidelity of the initial
states, after the noise from the resource state is mapped
to the initial states, see the previous section and [42], ex-
ceeds the threshold value qcrit. In this case the output
pairs will be private. The second condition, (B2), en-
sures that the fidelity of the output pairs is larger than
the fidelity of the input pairs. From this one sees that
for privacy one only needs to fulfill (B1), whereas both
(B1) and (B2) need to hold for purification. Observe that
(B1) is a condition due to the noise acting on the input
qubits (thereby increasing the required fidelity of the ini-
tial states to succeed hashing) whereas condition (B2)
stems from the noise applied to the output qubits (which
depolarizes the perfect Bell-pairs produced by noiseless
hashing in the asymptotic limit). This means that the
parameters α and q are more constrained if one aims for
increasing entanglement, as compared to the case of pri-
vacy. We summarize these findings in Fig. 1.
This observation provides a clear distinction between pri-
vacy and purification regime for asymptotic ensembles:
Both regimes, purification and privacy, have in common
that any eavesdropper factors out due to the protocol but
they differ with respect to whether entanglement is dis-
tilled or not. This motivates the term quantum privacy
distillation for the proposed overall protocol as there are
noise regimes where the protocol offers privacy, or equiv-
alently private entanglement, without achieving distilla-
tion.
A similar situation arises in the finite size case. Here, the
modifications will be that qcrit in (B1) is no longer directly
related to Fcrit and that (B2) needs to be modified to
α2qout(n, F ) > qin. (B3)
Here, qout(n, F ) quantifies the level of noise on the out-
put pairs of the hashing protocol for n initial states with
fidelity F . It can be obtained from the bound on the
fidelity of the output pairs. There will again be two dif-
ferent regimes, and the purification regime will be smaller
than the privacy regime due to the fact that it is more
constrained (there are two inequalities to be satisfied,
whereas there is only one for confidentiality).
Appendix C: Rate of convergence of noiseless
bipartite hashing for i.i.d. initial states
Here we provide the proof of Eq. (4) of the main text for
δ = n−1/5 summarized within the following Theorem.
Theorem 2 (Convergence for i.i.d. initial states). Let
E be the real protocol and F the ideal protocol tak-
ing n + kn initial states. Furthermore, let x1(δ) =
1/amax
[
(gmax + δ) log
(
1 + δgmax
)
− δ
]
where amax and
gmax are constants depending on Fmin and Fmax. Then
FIG. 1. Visualization of the different regimes in the α −
q plane (only the upper right corner of the entire plane is
shown). In the white area neither privacy nor purification is
achieved. In the entire colored area privacy is guaranteed,
but only in the blue area one has distillation. This means
that there is a parameter regime (yellow area), where one has
privacy despite the fact that the fidelity of the Bell pairs does
not increase during the distillation.
we have for all initial states ρ that
‖E(ρ⊗n+kn)−F(ρ⊗n+kn)‖1
≤ 2
[
2 exp(−nx1(n−1/5)) + exp
(
−n4/5 ln 2
)
+2 exp
(−(Fmax − Fmin)2kn/16)] . (C1)
Furthermore, the right-hand side of Eq. (4) of the main
text approaches exponentially fast zero.
Proof. Because the ideal and the real map are identical in
the aborting branch, we find for the initial states ρ⊗n+kn
that
‖E(ρ⊗n+kn)−F(ρ⊗n+kn)‖1
= pρ‖σAB − |B00〉 〈B00|⊗m ‖ ≤ εH (C2)
where σAB denotes the state of the hashing protocol after
n − m rounds and pρ the success probability for initial
state ρ. Thus we need to estimate εH. Because we twirl
the initial states towards Werner form we assume from
now on that they are of Werner form.
The hashing protocol can fail due to two reasons, see [29]:
the string corresponding to the initial states falls outside
the likely subspace or, after n − m rounds two or even
more configurations are compatible with the total parity
information, i.e. they can not be distinguished from each
other.
By denoting this failure probabilities by p′1 and p
′
2 and
the corresponding states after the protocol by σ1 and σ2
respectively, we find that the total failure probability p′f
of the hashing protocol satisfies p′f = p
′
1 + p
′
2. We also
observe that if the parameter estimation was accurate
the state after the protocol completes, i.e. σAB of (C2),
is given by
σAB = (1− p′f ) |B00〉 〈B00|⊗m +
2∑
i=1
p′iσi. (C3)
More precisely, with probability 1 − p′f we are able to
restore the output of the hashing protocol to m copies of
9|B00〉 and we end up with probabilities p′1 and p′2 in the
state σ1 and σ2 respectively. This implies for (C2) that
‖σAB − |B00〉 〈B00|⊗m ‖1 ≤ 2(p′1 + p′2) (C4)
via the triangle inequality for the case whenever param-
eter estimation is accurate.
Additionally the overall protocol can fail due to the fol-
lowing observation: The parameter estimation provides
an estimate F for the fidelity F which is accepted by the
participants, but F is actually outside the agreed range
[Fmin, Fmax]. In that case Alice and Bob run hashing
even though the protocol will either fail (since the initial
fidelity is too low) or the fidelity is too high to provide
accurate confidentiality estimates [58]. This observation
in turn implies that the state after hashing within the
ok-branch is maximum far from the asymptotic state of
the hashing protocol, i.e.
‖σAB − |B00〉 〈B00|⊗m ‖1 ≤ 2. (C5)
Nevertheless, the probability of the protocol succeeding
for initial state ρ also takes into account for parameter
estimation succeeding, i.e. pρ = p
′
3 · p′ where p′3 denotes
the probability of parameter estimation succeeding for
initial state ρ. Therefore, if Alice and Bob mistakenly
run hashing even if they should have aborted we find via
(C5) for (C2) that
pρ‖σAB − |B00〉 〈B00|⊗m ‖1 ≤ 2p′3. (C6)
So to summarize we obtain for an arbitrary initial state
ρ by combining (C4) and (C6) that
pρ‖σAB − |B00〉 〈B00|⊗m ‖1 ≤ 2(p′1 + p′2 + p′3). (C7)
Thus we are left to provide upper bounds for (the un-
known) probabilities p′1, p
′
2 and p
′
3 respectively, i.e. we
need to find p1, p2 and p3 such that p
′
i ≤ pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3
because this implies for (C7) that
pρ‖σAB − |B00〉 〈B00|⊗m ‖1 ≤ 2(p1 + p2 + p3). (C8)
We derive a bound for the probability of falling outside
the likely subspace p1 via the Bennett inequality [59].
Bennett’s inequality [59] states that we have for X1, .., Xn
independent random variables, where |Xi| ≤ a almost-
surely and the expected value of Xi is zero w.l.o.g., that
Pr
(∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣ > t
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−nσ
2
a2
h
(
at
nσ2
))
(C9)
where σ2 = 1/n
∑n
i=1 VarXi and h(u) = (1 + u) log(1 +
u)− u [60].
For the hashing protocol the random variables Xi take
the values Xi(k, l) := − log2 pkl − S(ρ) where ρ =∑1
k,l=0 pkl|Bkl〉〈Bkl| and S(ρ) = −
∑1
k,l=0 pkl log2 pkl de-
notes the von-Neumann entropy. The von-Neumann en-
tropy simplifies for states in Werner form to S(ρ) =
−F log2(F )− (1− F ) log2((1− F )/3) =: S(F ).
The i.i.d. assumption implies that all Xi are independent
and identical distributed (therefore we will subsequently
denote them by the random variable X), thus we find
σ2 = 1/n
∑n
i=1 VarXi = VarX =: V (F ). Hence we have
V (F ) = VarX =
∑
k,l
pkl(− log2 pkl − S(F ))2
=
∑
k,l
pkl(log
2
2 pkl + 2S(F ) log2 pkl + S
2(F ))
=
∑
k,l
pkl log
2
2 pkl + 2S(F )pkl log2 pkl + pklS
2(F )
=
∑
k,l
pkl log
2
2 pkl + 2S(F )(−S(F )) + S2(F )
= F log22 F + (1− F ) log22((1− F )/3)− S2(F ).
(C10)
We observe that the random variable X is bounded.
More precisely, we have |X(k, l)| = | log2 pkl + S(F )| ≤
| log2((1 − F )/3)| + S(F ) =: a(F ) because | log2((1 −
F )/3)| > | log2 F | for F > 0.8107 (which is the mini-
mum required fidelity for Werner states by the hashing
protocol).
The next step is to insert t = nδ, a = a(F ) and
σ2 = V (F ) in (C9) which yields by denoting the left-
hand-side of (C9) by p1
p1 ≤ 2 exp
(−nV (F )
a2(F )
h
(
a(F )nδ
nV (F )
))
= 2 exp
{−nV (F )
a2(F )
[(
1 +
a(F )δ
V (F )
)
log
(
1 +
a(F )δ
V (F )
)
−a(F )δ
V (F )
]}
= 2 exp
{ −n
a(F )
[(
V (F )
a(F )
+ δ
)
log
(
1 +
a(F )δ
V (F )
)
− δ
]}
.
(C11)
By defining g(F ) = V (F )a(F ) we rewrite the previous inequal-
ity as
p1 ≤ 2 exp
{ −n
a(F )
[
(g(F ) + δ) log
(
1 +
δ
g(F )
)
− δ
]}
.
(C12)
We observe that (C12) depends on the fidelity F of the
initial states which is inappropriate for confidentiality es-
timates. In order to obtain a bound which is independent
of the fidelity of the initial states we use that Alice and
Bob only run the hashing protocol if F ∈ [Fmin, Fmax].
We observe that (C12) is maximized whenever
n
a(F ) [(g(F ) + δ) log
(
1 + δg(F )
)
− δ] is minimal because
(g(F ) + δ) log
(
1 + δg(F )
)
− δ ≥ 0 which follows from
log(1 + x) ≥ xx+1 , n > 0 and a(F ) > 0.
For that purpose we show that the function y(x) =
(x+ b) log(1 + b/x)− b = (x+ b)(log(x+ b)− log(x))− b
is strictly monotonic decreasing in x. We obtain for the
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first derivative of y that
y′(x) = log(x+ b) +
x+ b
x+ b
−
(
log(x) +
x+ b
x
)
= log(x+ b) + 1− log(x)− 1− b
x
= log
(
x+ b
x
)
− b
x
= log
(
1 +
b
x
)
− b
x
≤ 0
(C13)
since log(1+z) ≤ z. Thus (g(F ) + δ) log
(
1 + δg(F )
)
−δ →
min whenever g(F )→ max.
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FIG. 2. Plot of the function g(F ). Observe that g is strictly
monotonic decreasing for F ∈ [0.82, 1).
From Figure 2 we see that g(F ) → max for F → min.
This implies for (C12) that
p1 ≤ 2 exp
{ −n
a(F )[
(g(Fmin) + δ) log
(
1 +
δ
g(Fmin)
)
− δ
]}
.
(C14)
Consequently (g(Fmin) + δ) log
(
1 + δg(Fmin)
)
−δ ≥ 0 and
a(F ) ≤ a(Fmax) implies
p1 ≤ 2 exp
{ −n
amax
[
(gmax + δ) log
(
1 +
δ
gmax
)
− δ
]}
(C15)
where amax = a(Fmax) and gmax = g(Fmin). We rewrite
(C15) in a more compact form by defining x1(δ) =
1/amax
[
(gmax + δ) log
(
1 + δgmax
)
− δ
]
and inserting δ =
n−1/5 [61] as
p1 ≤ 2 exp(−nx1(n−1/5)). (C16)
We will use (C16) for the confidentiality estimate (C8).
In order to show that (C16) ensures an exponential con-
vergence, as we claim, we need to provide an upper bound
for the exponent of (C16), i.e., for the function
− n
amax
[
(gmax + δ) log
(
1 +
δ
gmax
)
− δ
]
(C17)
where δ will be choosen later as n−1/5 as previously. By
defining
f(n) = n
(
(gmax + δ) log
(
1 +
δ
gmax
)
− δ
)
(C18)
(C17) reads as −f(n)/amax. In the following we com-
pute a lower bound y(n) for f(n), i.e. f(n) > y(n) for
all n, which is in turn an upper bound for (C16), i.e.
p1 ≤ 2 exp(−f(n)/amax) ≤ 2 exp(−y(n)/amax). Using
that log(1 + x) > x1+x/2 for x > 0, see [62], we find from
gmax > 0 and δ > 0 that
log
(
1 +
δ
gmax
)
>
δ
gmax
1 + δ2gmax
=
2δ
2gmax + δ
. (C19)
Furthermore we have that (gmax+δ) log
(
1 + δgmax
)
−δ ≥
0 which implies together with (C19) for (C18)
f(n) > n
(
(gmax + δ)
2δ
2gmax + δ
− δ
)
= n
2δ(gmax + δ)− (2gmax + δ)δ
2gmax + δ
= n
2δgmax + 2δ
2 − 2gmaxδ − δ2
2gmax + δ
=
nδ2
2gmax + δ
≥ nδ
2
2gmax + 1
(C20)
because δ ≤ 1. Inserting δ = n−1/5 finally gives
f(n) >
nδ2
2gmax + 1
=
n3/5
2gmax + 1
=: y(n) (C21)
implying
p1 ≤ 2 exp(−f(n)/amax) ≤ 2 exp(−y(n)/amax)
= 2 exp
(
− n
3/5
amax(2gmax + 1)
)
(C22)
which analytically proves the exponential scaling of the
hashing protocol.
Furthermore, following the approach of [29], we find that
the probability of having two configurations which are
compatible with the collected parity information, p2, is
bounded by 2−nδ. Thus, inserting δ = n−1/5 gives
p2 < 2
−n4/5 .
Finally we provide an estimate for the probability of ac-
cepting initial states from Eve in the case when Alice
and Bob should abort the protocol after parameter esti-
mation, i.e. the actual fidelity F is below the minimum
required value Fmin but the estimate F is not, or the ac-
tual fidelity F is above Fmax but the estimate F is not,
corresponding to the probability p′3. For that purpose we
perform two-qubit measurements of two Bell-pairs, the
first w.r.t. the X ⊗ X and the second w.r.t. the Z ⊗ Z
observable. One easily observes that |B00〉 is the common
+1 eigenstate of both operators. By referring to this mea-
surements as M1 and M2 respectively and recalling that
the parameter estimation utilizes kn systems we define
the random variables Fi associated with a pair of Bell-
pairs for 1 ≤ i ≤ kn/2 which is equal to 1 whenever M1
and M2 simultaneously reveal outcome 1 and 0 otherwise.
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Recall that the Hoeffding inequality [63] states that we
have for X1, .., Xn i.i.d. random variables where ai ≤
Xi ≤ bi, ci = bi−ai, Sn =
∑
iXi and the expected value
En of Sn, i.e. En = E[Sn], that
Pr (|Sn − En| > t) < 2 exp
(
− 2t
2
nC2
)
(C23)
holds for all t and where ∀i : ci ≤ C. Hoeffding’s
inequality (C23) implies now for the empirical mean
F = 2/(kn)
∑kn/2
i=1 Fi that
Pr(|F − E[F ]| > η) < 2 exp(−η2kn) (C24)
holds for all η. More precisely, the probability of esti-
mating an error larger than η via F to E[F ] is decay-
ing exponential in n. So Alice and Bob choose Fmin
and Fmax and they agree to continue with the hashing
protocol whenever F ∈ [FPE − ∆/4, FPE + ∆/4] where
FPE = (Fmin + Fmax)/2 and ∆ = Fmax − Fmin. Fixing
η = ∆/4 implies for (C24) that
Pr(|F − E[F ]| > η) < 2 exp(−(Fmax − Fmin)2kn/16).
(C25)
In other words, (C25) means that the probability that
Alice and Bob continue with the hashing protocol in case
they should abort, i.e., the actual fidelity F is outside
[Fmin, Fmax], is exponentially small. For example, if the
fidelity estimate F is F = FPE+∆/4 (which implies Alice
and Bob will run hashing), then the probability that the
actual fidelity F satisfies F > FPE + ∆/2 = Fmax is
exponentially bounded.
To summarize, we find for (C2) that
‖E(ρ⊗n+kn)−F(ρ⊗n+kn)‖1
≤ 2
[
2 exp(−nx1(n−1/5)) + exp
(
−n4/5 ln 2
)
+2 exp
(−(Fmax − Fmin)2kn/16)] . (C26)
Notice that the right-hand side of (C26) is independent
of ρ, which completes the proof.
Appendix D: Local closeness implies global closeness
In the main text we formulated the following claim: If
the output of the real and ideal map differ at most ε for
a particular initial state then they differ at most 4
√
ε
for any purification of this initial state. We prove this
statement within the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Let E be the real and F be the ideal protocol.
Furthermore let ρ be a mixed state shared by the partici-
pants of the protocol. If ‖E(ρ)−F(ρ)‖1 ≤ ε, then
‖(E ⊗ idE −F ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE)‖1 ≤ 4
√
ε (D1)
for all purifications |ψ〉ABE of ρ.
Proof. We observe that
E(ρ) = pρσAB ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|
+ (1− pρ)σ⊥AB ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail| (D2)
F(ρ) = pρ |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|⊗mAB ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|
+ (1− pρ)σ⊥AB ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail| . (D3)
The assumption ‖E(ρ) − F(ρ)‖1 ≤ ε implies pρ‖σAB −
|ϕ〉 〈ϕ|⊗mAB ‖1 ≤ ε because E(ρ) and F(ρ) are equal on the
fail branch. Thus we have ‖σAB − |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|⊗mAB ‖1 ≤ ε/pρ.
Furthermore we find for the application of the real and
the ideal protocol to the purification |ψ〉ABE of ρAB that
(E ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE) = pρσABE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|
+ (1− pρ)σ⊥ABE ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail| , (D4)
(F ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE) = pρ |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|⊗mAB ⊗ ρE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|
+ (1− pρ)σ⊥ABE ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail| . (D5)
This implies for the 1-norm that
‖(E ⊗ idE −F ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE)‖1
= pρ‖σABE − |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|⊗mAB ⊗ ρE‖1. (D6)
Thus we need to show that pρ‖σABE − |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|⊗mAB ⊗
ρE‖1 ≤ 4
√
ε. One easily verifies trE [σABE ] = σAB and
trAB [σABE ] = ρE because the system E is not affected by
the protocol E . Recall that we have by assumption that
‖σAB − |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|⊗mAB ‖1 ≤ ε/pρ. Thus we apply Lemma 10
of the supplementary material from [28] to ρSE := σABE
and ϕSE := |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|⊗mAB ⊗ρE where S := AB which implies
‖σABE − |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|⊗mAB ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ 4
√
ε/pρ. (D7)
Employing (D7) in (D6) yields
‖(E ⊗ idE −F ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE)‖1
≤ pρ4
√
ε/pρ = 4
√
pρε ≤ 4
√
ε (D8)
which completes the proof.
Appendix E: Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Due to the symmetrization we find that Es and
Fs are permutation invariant maps. Hence applying the
post-selection technique of [46] gives
‖Es −Fs‖
≤ gn+kn,d‖(Es ⊗ idE −Fs ⊗ idE)(|τ〉 〈τ |ABE)‖1
(E1)
where d is determined by the number of participants (see
discussion below) and |τ〉ABE is a purification of the de-
Finetti Hilbert-Schmidt state, hence trE [|τ〉 〈τ |ABE] =∫
σ⊗n+knAB dµ(σ) =: τ
′ where µ is the measure induced
by the Hilbert-Schmidt metric on End(Cd). One easily
observes that
‖Es(τ ′)−Fs(τ ′)‖1 =
∥∥∥∥(Es −Fs)(∫ σ⊗n+knAB dµ(σ))∥∥∥∥
1
≤ max
σAB
∥∥(E − F) (σ⊗n+knAB )∥∥1 (E2)
where E and F denote the subprotocols after symmetriza-
tion. As |τ〉ABE is a purification of τ ′ we can apply
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Lemma 1 implying for (E1) that
‖Es −Fs‖
≤ gn+kn,d‖(Es ⊗ idE −Fs ⊗ idE)(|τ〉 〈τ |ABE)‖1
≤ gn+kn,d4
√
‖(Es −Fs)(trE [|τ〉 〈τ |ABE])‖1
= 4gn+kn,d
√
‖(Es −Fs)(τ ′)‖1
≤ 4gn+kn,d
√
max
σAB
∥∥(E − F) (σ⊗n+knAB )∥∥1 (E3)
where the second inequality stems from Lemma 1 and the
last inequality from (E2) which finally shows the claim.
Appendix F: Confidentiality of a noisy
measurement-based implementation of the hashing
protocol
Within this section we prove Eq. (8) of the main text. In
doing so, we formulate the following Theorem.
Theorem 3. Let Es,α and Fs,α be the real and the
ideal noisy hashing protocol prepended by symmetrization
where noise of strength 1 − α of the form (A1) acts on
each qubit of the resource state independent and identical.
Then
‖Es,α −Fs,α‖ ≤ ‖Es −Fs‖. (F1)
Proof. The resource state necessary for the measurement-
based implementation of hashing is pure and minimal in
the number of qubits and consists only of input and out-
put qubits, because all quantum gates involved in the
hashing protocol are elements of the Clifford group [41].
Hence there are only two different locations at which noise
acts: input and output qubits. For the noise acting on
the input qubits we use the observation made in [42],
which enables us to virtually move the noise from the in-
put qubits to the initial states, thereby increasing their
entropy. For the noise acting on the output qubits, as
described in the main text, we can safely assume that
this noise will act after the protocol completes, leaving
us with a noiseless hashing protocol (w.r.t. the output
qubits).
We deal with the noise on the input qubits by a slight
modification of the parameter estimation step. Recall
that Alice and Bob fix Fmin and Fmax for parameter
estimation and they continue with the hashing proto-
col whenever their fidelity estimate F is within the in-
terval [F−, F+] where F± = FPE ± ∆/4 for FPE =
(Fmax +Fmin)/2 and ∆ = Fmax−Fmin. The noise acting
on the input qubits of the resource states increases the
entropy of the initial states which forces Alice and Bob to
accept less initial states from Eve. By describing the ini-
tial states in an i.i.d. setting after the twirl via i.i.d. LDN
of the form (A1), i.e. ρ = D1(q) |B00〉 〈B00|, the parame-
ter estimation interval [F−, F+] transforms to [q−, q+] via
q± = (4F±−1)/3. According to the previous observation
that we can virtually move the noise of level α on the
input qubits of the resource states, D1(α) and D2(α) re-
spectively, to the initial states we consequently describe
the initial states as D2(α)D1(α)D1(q) |B00〉 〈B00| =
D1(α
2)D1(q) |B00〉 〈B00| = D1(α2q) |B00〉 〈B00|, see also
Fig. 3. Observe that we have moved the noise from Bob’s
to Alice’s side due to the symmetry of Bell-states. Thus
FIG. 3. The figure shows, at an abstract level, how noise
on the input qubits is moved from the resource states to the
initial states. The blue ellipsis indicate Bell-measurements,
the red vertex the input qubits of the resource state and the
light-blue vertex the qubits of the initial states.
we need to have α2q ∈ [q−, q+] to pass the parameter es-
timation and run the hashing protocol. Observe that α2q
transforms to the fidelity F ′ of the initial states, includ-
ing the noise of the resource state, via α2q = (4F ′−1)/3.
Therefore we modify the parameter estimation to con-
tinue with the hashing protocol whenever the estimate of
the fidelity F of the initial states satisfies
F ∈
[
3q− + α2
4α2
,
3q+ + α
2
4α2
]
, (F2)
see Fig. 4.
We denote the protocols with modified parameter esti-
FIG. 4. The interval for parameter estimation acceptance
[Fmin, Fmax] transforms according to (F2) to [F
′
min, F
′
max].
mation according to condition (F2) by the maps Es,α−in
and Fs,α−in respectively. It follows immediately from
the definition of the protocols that we achieve the same
confidentiality level of Eq. (7) of the main text as for
the noiseless protocols, Alice and Bob will just abort the
protocol more often. Hence we easily deduce
‖Es,α−in −Fs,α−in‖ = ‖Es −Fs‖. (F3)
We now extend the confidentiality proof to a full noisy
measurement-based implementation of the hashing pro-
tocol protocol as follows: Since we can effectively move
noise of level α acting on the input qubits of the resource
states to the to-be-purified ensemble, the modification
(F2) of the parameter estimation extends the confiden-
tiality proof via (F3) to noise acting on the input qubits
of the resource state. For noise acting on the output
qubits we use the following observation: Because the
noise is assumed to be of the form (A1) it is also CPTP.
By denoting the noise acting on the output qubits as
Nα = ⊗mj=1Dj;A(α)Dj;B(α) where A and B denote Al-
ice’s and Bob’s parts of the final Bell-pairs, the noisy real
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protocol and ideal protocol read as Es,α = Nα ◦ Es,α−in
and Fs,α = Nα ◦ Fs,α−in respectively [64]. Hence (F3)
and the contractivity of the 1−norm for CPTP maps im-
ply
‖Es,α −Fs,α‖ = ‖Nα ◦ (Es,α−in −Fs,β−in)‖
≤ ‖Es,α−in −Fs,α−in‖ = ‖Es −Fs‖.
(F4)
What remains to be dealt with are the Pauli byproduct
operators due to the measurement outcomes at the in-
puts, but since LDN of the form (A1) commutes with the
Pauli byproduct operators we do not have to worry about
them in the proof of confidentiality, which completes the
proof.
Appendix G: Confidentiality of multiparty hashing
protocol for two-colorable graph states
We start by recalling some basic notation, definitions and
properties of graph states.
We define the graph state basis |ψκ1,...,κN 〉 where
κ1, . . . , κN ∈ {0, 1} associated with a graph G = (V,E)
where N = |V | as the common eigenstate of the correla-
tion operators
Kj = X
(j)
∏
{j,k}∈E
Z(k) (G1)
with eigenvalues (−1)κj for 1 ≤ j ≤ N where the su-
perscript denote the qubit on which the Pauli operator is
acting on. We refer to the state |ψ0,...,0〉 also as the graph
state associated with G = (V,E). Note that the states
{|ψκ1,...,κN 〉}1κ1,...,κN=0 form a basis of the Hilbert-space
(C2)⊗N . A special class of graph states are so-called two-
colorable graph states which correspond to two-colorable
graphs. A graph is said to be two-colorable if there exists
a mapping f : V → {1, 2} such that for all vertices v ∈ V
it holds that f(v) 6= f(w) for all neighbors w ∈ V of
v. The most prominent example of two-colorable graph
states are GHZ and cluster states [54].
Suppose we want to distill a two-colorable graph state
|ψ0...0〉 corresponding to a graph G = (V,E) where
V = VA ∪VB , A and B denote the colors and |VA| = NA,
|VB | = NB where N = NA + NB . The multipar-
tite hashing protocol assumes asymptotically many i.i.d.
initial states ρ diagonal in the graph state basis, i.e.
ρ =
∑
µ,ν λµ,ν |ψµ,ν〉 〈ψµ,ν | where µ = (µ1, . . . , µNA) ∈
{0, 1}NA and ν = (ν1, . . . , νNB ) ∈ {0, 1}NB are multi-
indices corresponding to color A and B respectively [65].
For two-colorable graph states we define multilateral
CNOTs on two copies ρ1 and ρ2 which enable us to trans-
fer information between the initial states ρ1 and ρ2. More
precisely, by applying a CNOT to all particles in VA (VB)
where ρ1 serves as target(source) and ρ2 as source (tar-
get) a straightforward computation leads to (by denoting
this unitary as U1)
|ψµ,ν〉 ⊗ |ψµ′,ν′〉 U1→ |ψµ,ν⊕ν′〉 ⊗ |ψµ⊕µ′,ν′〉 . (G2)
By exchanging the roles of VA and VB one obtains (by
denoting this unitary as U2)
|ψµ,ν〉 ⊗ |ψµ′,ν′〉 U2→ |ψµ⊕µ′,ν〉 ⊗ |ψµ′,ν⊕ν′〉 . (G3)
Suppose we measure all qubits of the graph state
|ψµ1,...,µNA ,ν1,...,νNB 〉 belonging to the set VA with the
X and all qubits of the set VB with the Z observable.
By denoting the outcomes of the X measurements with
ξi ∈ {0, 1} and the outcomes of the Z measurements with
ζj ∈ {0, 1} one immediately finds via (G1)
µi =
ξi + ∑
{i,j}∈E
ζj
 mod 2 (G4)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ NA. In other words, we can use this mea-
surement setting to reveal information about all κi for
1 ≤ i ≤ NA simultaneously. We refer to this measure-
ments with M1. Similarly, by exchanging the roles of VA
and VB we obtain information about all νi for 1 ≤ i ≤ Nb.
In the following, we refer to this measurements with M2.
The multiparty hashing protocol is now defined as follows
[30]: In order to reveal information about color A, i.e. µ,
(which we denote as sub-protocol P1) we apply U1 to a
random subset of the n initial states with common tar-
get system (thereby accumulating the values correspond-
ing to color A) and perform measurement M1 on this
common system. Similarly, by applying U2 to a random
subset of the initial states with a common target system
(thereby accumulating the values corresponding to color
B) followed by M2 on this common system one obtains
information about color B, i.e. ν (which we denote as
sub-protocol P2). Repeating the sub-protocols P1 and P2
sufficiently many times leads to perfect knowledge about
the remaining states, i.e. one ends up in a pure state
(which we restore to the target state |ψ0,...,0〉⊗m).
Recall that the overall protocol prepends the multiparty
hashing protocol by a twirling and parameter estima-
tion step. The twirling step ensures that the initial
states are diagonal within the graph state basis, see [30],
whereas the participants use parameter estimation to de-
cide whether the multiparty hashing protocol will succeed
or not.
Formally, we define the probabilities
a
(µi)
i =
∑
µk 6=µj ,ν
λµ1,...,µi,...,µNA ,ν (G5)
b
(νj)
j =
∑
νk 6=νj ,µ
λµ,ν1,...,νj ,...,νNB (G6)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ NA and 1 ≤ j ≤ NB . For example,
for a three-qubit state we have a
(0)
1 =
∑
k,l λ0kl and
a
(1)
1 =
∑
k,l λ1kl. Observe that the values S(ai) and S(bj)
correspond to the entropies of µi and νj within the vec-
tors µ and ν.
As shown in [30], the protocol described above is in
the asymptotic limit capable of distilling m = n(1 −
max1≤i≤NA S(ai)−max1≤j≤NB S(bj)) copies of the state
|ψ0,...,0〉.
Now we are ready to compute the distance of the real and
ideal multiparty hashing protocol for i.i.d. initial states.
Intuitively it follows from the same arguments as in the
bipartite setting.
Theorem 4. Let E be the real and F be the ideal mul-
tiparty hashing protocol. Furthermore let ρ be an initial
state. Then
‖E(ρ⊗n+kn)−F(ρ⊗n+kn)‖1 ≤ εH (G7)
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where εH ∈ O(exp(−
√
n)) is independent of the initial
state ρ.
Proof. Recall that the multiparty hashing protocol aims
to distill several copies of a two-colorable graph state via
the sub-protocols P1 for color A and P2 for color B from
n copies of the initial state ρ =
∑
µ,ν |ψµ,ν〉 〈ψµ,ν | where
the states |ψµ,ν〉 correspond to the graph state basis.
The crucial observation is that we learn the values of
µ and ν corresponding to the colors A and B within n
copies of the initial state ρ =
∑
µ,ν |ψµ,ν〉 〈ψµ,ν | via the
sub-protocols P1 and P2 independently. In other words,
µ and ν do not get correlated during the protocol exe-
cution, i.e. they remain independent. By taking a closer
look at P1 (P2) we infer that also the individual compo-
nents of µ (ν) remain independent. In particular, the
components of µ = (µ1, . . . , µNA) (ν = (ν1, . . . , νNB )) re-
main distinct during the protocol, i.e. for each i the value
µi is independent of µk for all k 6= i (for each j the value
νj is independent of νk for all k 6= j). This is due to the
fact that U1 (U2) operates component-wise on µ (ν) [66].
Keeping this observations in mind, it is straightforward
to provide finite size estimates for the fidelity of the state
after the protocol relative to |ψ0,...,0〉. Observe that the
hashing protocol fails if either P1 or P2 fails which im-
plies for the failure probability pf of the hashing protocol
pf ≤ pP1 +pP2 where pP1 and pP2 denote the failure prob-
abilities of sub-protocol P1 and P2 respectively.
First we discuss the failure probability of sub-protocol
P1. This sub-protocol can fail due to three reasons, sim-
ilar as in the bipartite setting: the initial states do not
belong to the likely subspace or, after the sub-protocol
has finished, two or more configurations are compatible
with the collected parity information, or the protocol is
continued mistakenly after parameter estimation, i.e. the
parties should have aborted but continued the multiparty
hashing protocol to its very end.
To provide an estimate for the probability that the initial
states fall outside the likely subspace w.r.t. sub-protocol
P1 we define for color A the random variables X
(i)(b) for
1 ≤ i ≤ NA which take the values
X(i)(b) = − log2 a(b)i − S(ai) (G8)
with probability a
(b)
i . In order to learn µ, we observe
that a specific µ = (µ1, . . . , µNA) belongs to the likely
subspace L whenever each µi belongs to its likely sub-
space Li, i.e.
µ ∈ L ⇔ ∀1 ≤ i ≤ NA : µi ∈ Li. (G9)
Consequently
Pr (µ /∈ L) ≤
NA∑
i=1
Pr (µi /∈ Li) ≤ NA max
1≤i≤NA
Pr (µi /∈ Li) .
(G10)
We estimate Pr (µi /∈ Li) via Hoeffding’s inequality [63].
In order to apply Hoeffding’s inequality we need to make
sure that λµ,ν 6= 0 for all µ and ν after twirling, as the the
random variables X(i)(b) of (G8) need to be bounded. We
achieve this by mixing each individual initial state with a
small, but defined, portion of the identity operator. From
this we observe that the random variables X(i) have zero
mean and that |X(i)| ≤ maxb∈0,1 | log2 a(b)i |+S(ai) =: Ci
after mixing. Therefore the Hoeffding inequality implies
Pr
(∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
k=1
X
(i)
k
∣∣∣∣∣ > t
)
≤ 2 exp
(−2t2
nC2i
)
(G11)
for all t where k denotes the index of the initial state
within ρ⊗n and i the i−th component of µ. Inserting
t = nδ in (G11) together with δ = n−1/4 yields
Pr (µi /∈ Li) = Pr
(∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
k=1
X
(i)
k
∣∣∣∣∣ > n3/4
)
≤ 2 exp
(−2√n
C2i
)
≤ 2 exp
(−2√n
C2
)
(G12)
where C = max1≤i≤NA Ci. Note that (G12) is indepen-
dent of i, which implies for (G10) that
Pr (µ /∈ L) ≤ 2NA exp
(−2√n
C2
)
. (G13)
Observe that C = max1≤i≤NA Ci still depends on the
initial states. Due to parameter estimation one finds an-
other constant C ′ > C independent of the initial states.
The probability of not being able to distinguish between
two or more configurations is, for a particular component
of µ, again 2−nδ, as for the bipartite case. Hence insert-
ing δ = n−1/4 gives that the probability of misidentifying
a specific µi where 1 ≤ i ≤ NA is bounded by 2−n3/4 .
Therefore the probability of misidentifying µ is bounded
by NA2
−n3/4 .
We point out that also in the multipartite setting a pa-
rameter estimation step is crucial in order to ensure dis-
tillation. For that purpose we find that the states after
twirling and mixing are diagonal within the graph state
basis, i.e. of the form
ρ =
∑
µ,ν
λµ,ν |ψµ,ν〉 〈ψµ,ν | (G14)
where all λµ,ν 6= 0. The goal of parameter estimation is
to provide estimates ai and bj for the probability distri-
butions ai and bj of (G5) and (G6) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ NA
and 1 ≤ j ≤ NB . The concrete boundaries for which the
participants continue with hashing depends on the tar-
get state of the protocol. However, it suffices to estimate
λµ,ν for all µ and ν which we denote by λµ,ν . Observe
that we have to determine in total 2N coefficients, where
N denotes the number of participants and is constant.
This can be done via measurements on kn systems of ρ
according to the observables of the correlation operators
(G1). Indeed, the expected values of the correlation op-
erators are sufficient to determine the coefficients λµ,ν for
all µ and ν within ρ =
∑
µ,ν λµ,ν |ψµ,ν〉 〈ψµ,ν |. Now one
can apply Hoeffding’s inequality to exponentially bound
the probabilities that the estimates λµ,ν of λµ,ν have a
distance larger than some fixed η > 0 (which corrsponds
to the accuracy of our estimate λµ,ν) similar to the bi-
partite case. From this we deduce that the probability of
continuing with the hashing protocol mistakenly is expo-
nentially small in terms of the number n of initial states.
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In summary, via the same argument as in the bipar-
tite case (i.e. the previous estimates are upper bounds
for the real failure probabilities, see (C3), (C4) and
(C8)), the probability that sub-protocol P1 fails satisfies
pP1 ∈ O(exp(−
√
n)). Similarly one obtains that sub-
protocol P2 fails with probability pP2 ∈ O(exp(−
√
n))
which implies that pf ∈ O(exp(−
√
n)), thereby proving
εH ∈ O(exp(−
√
n)) as claimed.
Observe that Eq. (G7) is restricted to i.i.d. initial states
rather than arbitrary initial states and does not take into
account Eve’s purification of the initial states. But since
Theorem 1 of the main text is also applicable to the mul-
tiparty hashing protocol, we eliminate these issues and
immediately infer for the multiparty hashing protocol
prepended by symmetrization by using (G7) that
‖Es −Fs‖ ≤ 4(n+ kn+ 1)4M−1√εH. (G15)
The proof of (G15) is simple: Theorem 1 of the main text
applies to the multiparty hashing protocol with d = 2M ,
where M denotes the number of participants. Hence (G7)
implies (G15) via Theorem 1 of the main text.
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